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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940602-CA 
vs. : 
MARK J. HOBEL, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction, pursuant to a 
"conditional" guilty plea, of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine, a Second-
Degree Felony, in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8, 
Utah Code Ann., Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with 
Intent to Distribute Marijuana, a Third-Degree Felony, in violation 
of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8, Utah Code Ann. and Violation of 
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 
Title 59, Chapter 19, Section 101 et seq., Utah Code Ann. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to 
suppress for failure to provide sufficient evidence to establish 
probable cause in the affidavit in support of search warrant under 
the "totality of the circumstances", established by Illinois vs. 
Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). Secondly, do the facts of the 
present case allow the evidence to be admitted under the "Leon 
Exception", U.S. vs. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 27, 1993 Officer Garth Wilkinson was supervising 
the Iron and Beaver County Narcotics Task Force. It was an effort 
using fifteen peace officers to serve nineteen felony warrants. 
One of the warrants was served on a gentlemen named Yates, who for 
the last 24 hours had been snorting cocaine and methamphet amine, as 
proffered on page 7, lines 1-12 of the transcript of the motion to 
suppress in the addendum. Wilkinson met with Yates (hereinafter 
referred to as CI) at the Iron County jail, who was charged with 
distributing methamphetamine and offered a plea bargain for the 
following information: (a) That there were presently two Mexican 
individuals at the "Marcos" residence who deliver large quantities 
of marijuana and methamphetamine; (b) that one individual spoke 
English and was called "Marcos" and that the other individual did 
not speak English; (c) that CI was in the "Marcos" residence within 
the last twenty four hours and had observed approximately five (5) 
pounds of marijuana and approximately one-quarter (1/4) pound of a 
controlled substance, methamphetamine; (d) that CI had purchased a 
controlled substance from "Marcos" on several prior occasions; and 
(e) that CI could identify several other persons in the Iron County 
area that had purchased marijuana, methamphetamine and cocaine from 
"Marcos." 
Wilkinson asserts that CI is trustworthy and has provided 
reliable information in that CI was asked to inform Wilkinson of 
all known drug buyers, users and sellers in the Iron County area, 
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and that he told Wilkinson of seven individuals who are buying or 
selling quantities of controlled substances in Iron County, 
Wilkinson also stated that CI was presently charged with two second 
degree felonies and has been offered a plea agreement by the Iron 
County Attorney wherein CI would plead guilty to a third-degree 
felony in the event that the information is correct and there are 
large quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine at said residence 
and/or vehicle. Wilkinson was informed by CI that "Marcos" and the 
other unidentified male have informed CI that they are closely 
associated with the "Mexican mafia" and that they may be dangerous 
and may pose a threat of violence to officers serving a search 
warrant. 
Based on Officer Wilkinson's Affidavit, Judge Eves issued a 
Search Warrant for the "Marcos" residence on October 27, 1993, 
which resulted in the discovery of approximately five and one-half 
(5-1/2) pounds of marijuana and approximately one and one-half (1-
1/2) ounces of methamphetamine. Subsequently, Defendant Mark Hobel 
was charged by Information with one count of Unlawful Possession of 
a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, to Wit: 
Methamphetamine, a Second-degree Felony; one count of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, to 
wit: Marijuana, a Third Degree Felony; and one count of Violation 
of Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, a Third Degree Felony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT 
IN THE INSTANT CASE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
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ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Both the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution require 
that all search warrants be based upon "probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation". Whether an "informant based" affidavit 
satisfies the probable cause standard is determined by the 
"totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis enunciated in Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 103, S.Ct* 2317, 76 L. ED. 572 (1983). The Utah 
Supreme Court First adopted this test in State v. Anderton, 668 P 
2d 1259 (Utah 1983). Some of the factors to be considered in using 
this test are: 
The veracity, reliability, and basis of 
knowledge of confidential informants and 
whether the judicial official issuing the 
warrant used a practical common sense 
decision. 
State v. Hansen, 732 P. 2d 127 (Utah 1987). The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that the weight accorded these factors may vary 
according to the circumstances. State v. Bailey, 675 P. 2d 1203 
(Utah 1984). In State v. Ayala, 762 P. 2d 1107 (Utah 1988), 
narcotics officers had arranged a controlled drug buy, using an 
informant,at the defendant's residence seven days prior to the 
execution of the search warrant for the residence. A second 
informant also indicated that heroin had been sold out of the 
residence for some- time. The Court, in response to defendant's 
assertions that the affidavit was insufficient to establish 
probable cause, noted that the officer had observed the controlled 
buy and therefor had knowledge that it had, in fact, occurred. The 
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court, after citing Gates stated: 
All of these events were within the personal 
knowledge of the officer. Contrary to 
defendant's argument, the only part of the 
officer's affidavit in which the knowledge, 
veracity, and reliability of the confidential 
informant are at issue involved the second 
informant's naked assertion that heroin was 
being sold out of the residence. The second 
informant's hearsay evidence is merely 
corroborative of the more substantive 
information contained in the affidavit. In 
issuing the search warrant, the magistrate had 
available the first hand observations of the 
affiant, an experienced narcotics officer. 
From those observations,the magistrate could 
reasonably infer that contraband would be 
found ...Id. at 1110. (Emphasis added) 
The most recent case, which is directly on point, is that of State 
v. Potter, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, Ut. Ct. App. (1993). In Potter, 
Mr. Sandstrom left Potter's trailer home and shortly thereafter was 
stopped by an Emery County Sheriff's deputy who suspected that 
Sandstrom was driving under the influence. Deputy Jensen requested 
Sandstrom to exit the vehicle for field sobriety testing at which 
time sandstrom volunteered information that Jim Ward, a known drug 
user, and seven others were smoking marijuana inside Potter's home 
and asked if giving this information to the deputy would help him 
regarding his likely DUI charge. 1A. at 29. Deputy Jensen then 
contacted Tom Harrison, the Emery County narcotics detective, and 
relayed to him the information given to him by Sandstrom. 
Detective Harrison then spoke with Sandstrom personally, who 
repeated his account of the activities in Potter's home and further 
claimed that the individual in the trailer home had "about three 
fingers" of marijuana. At that time, Detective Harrison directed 
Deputy Jensen and other officers to watch Potter's home while he 
obtained a search warrant. .Id. Detective Harrison returned to the 
Sheriff's office to complete the application for search warrant. 
Detective Harrison based his warrant affidavit upon (1) the fact 
that Potter was the subject of an ongoing drug investigation; (2) 
the presence of Jim Ward, a known drug user, at the Potter's 
trailer home; and (3) that informant Sandstrom's claim that Ward 
and seven others were smoking marijuana inside Potter's home. 
Detective Harrison completed the application and affidavit and took 
them to a magistrate for review and signature. Id. Potter was 
subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance, to 
wit: marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia. 
The Court of Appeals, in reviewing the affidavit in support of 
the search warrant, stated that "because the probable cause 
determination focuses on the probability that evidence of the crime 
will currently be found in a particular place, citing Gates, 462 
U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332, the first two of the above grounds 
are not properly part of that determination. First, the fact that 
Potter was under investigation for drug distribution does not 
indicate that controlled substances will currently be found in this 
trailer. Second, the presence of Jim Ward, a convicted drug user, 
does not establish that controlled substances would presently be 
found in the Potter trailer." _Id. at 30. 
The Court of Appeals' main focus was on the reliability of 
Sandstrom's allegations, his basis of knowledge, veracity and 
reliability which needs to be demonstrated in order to establish 
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probable cause. Id., at 31. The Court of Appeals determined that 
the basis of Sandstroms knowledge was proper since it was allegedly 
based on personal observation. Sandstrom told Detective Harrison 
that he had just left Potter's trailer and was driving around 
specifically because he did not want to be present while the 
individuals inside the home smoked marijuana. Furthermore, 
Sandstrom claimed to know the occupants of the trailer possessed a 
baggie containing "about three fingers" of marijuana and named 
Potter and Ward as two of the occupants. Id. 
The court then determined that Sandstrom's veracity and 
reliability was suspect since the information he provided was not 
corroborated by, and was in fact directly contradicted by, other 
evidence available to the officer. First, Sandstrom volunteered 
the information only after being pulled over for drunk driving, and 
for the sole purpose of "getting a break" in the almost certain DUI 
charge against him. Said circumstances remove this case from the 
ambit of those cases in which a citizen receives nothing from the 
police in exchange for the information, and seriously calls into 
question Sandstrom fs reliability and veracity. .Id. (Emphasis 
added). Based on all of the factors, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the trial court's determination the evidence should be suppressed. 
This Defendant submits that the facts presented in the 
affidavit in the instant case do not support probable cause under 
the "totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis. 
In the present case Yates was arrested and charged with two 
felony's and would have done anything to get out of his situation. 
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Mr. Yates had never been an informant before, nor did officer 
Wilkinson know the defendant. Furthermore, at the time of the plea 
negotiation and the obtaining of the information Yates was on 
cocaine and methamphetamine and had been all night. Officer 
Wilkinson did not have any other means of verifying Yates 
information and did not have any knowledge that any drugs had been 
sold, or were being sold out of the "Marcos" residence. None of 
the events in the instant case were within the personal knowledge 
of the officer. 
The information regarding the quantities stated by Yates were 
inconsistent, and further he gave no description of the premises 
even though he had indicated Marcos might be dangerous as he could 
be associated with the "Mexican Mafia". In order for the warrant to 
be supported by probable cause, the magistrate's action in issuing 
the warrant "cannot be a mere ratification of the bear conclusion 
of other's. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. Not only is this what occurred 
in this case, but even after the magistrate had knowledge that 
Yates was on cocaine and methamphetamine he stated on page 8, lines 
17-19 of the suppression transcript in the addendum: The Court: 
"Probably. I don't think that being under the influence of cocaine 
or alcohol automatically renders you unreliable." 
The case of State v. Ramirez, 817 P. 2d 774 at 782 enunciates 
a test in considering reliability: (a) the opportunity of the 
witness to view the events; (b) the degree of attention to what is 
witnessed;(c) the capacity of the witness to observe, was he 
impaired by stress or fright at the time of the observation, by 
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personal motivations, biases, or prejudices, by uncorrected visual 
defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol. Under this test 
and based on the argument herein, Defendant submits that the 
warrant executed at the "Marcos" residence was not supported by 
probable cause and, therefore, all the evidence obtained pursuant 
to the warrant should have been suppressed. 
POINT II 
THE "LEON" EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENTS 
DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT 
WAS SO LACKING IN INDICIA OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS TO 
RENDER OFFICIAL BELIEF IN ITS EXISTENCE UNREASONABLE 
In United States v. Leon, 486 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme 
Court ruled that evidence seized in reliance upon a deficient 
warrant, including those which lack probable cause, would not be 
suppressed so long as the officer executing it was acting in good 
faith. The court, however, noted that not all deficient warrants 
would avoid Fourth Amendment sanction: 
In the absence of an allegation that the 
magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral 
role, suppression is appropriate only if the 
officers were dishonest or reckless in 
preparing their affidavit or could not have 
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in 
the existence of probable cause. Leon, at 962. 
Defendant submits that the Leon exception should not apply in 
the instant case because of the reckless approach of officer 
Wilkinson. During his initial interview he was unaware of Yates 
being under the influence of cocaine and methamphetamine, which 
impairs all faculties necessary to be reliable. Nor had officer 
Wilkinson ever used Yates as an informant. All the information 
being given by Yates was to avoid prosecution of two second-degree 
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felony's. Officer Wilkinson did not attempt to verify any of the 
information from Yates. Officer Wilkinson did not have any 
personal knowledge of drug sales, drug use or any other illegal 
activity at the "Marcos" home, sufficient to establish probable 
cause. 
The purpose behind the leon exception is to allow diligent, 
reasonable and organized officers to keep evidence that is found 
pursuant to a defective search warrant. However, it is not for the 
purpose of allowing officers unrestricted and unreasonable rights 
to intrude on the private sector without having some indicia of 
probable cause which lacks in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above argument, Defendant hereby request the 
Court of Appeals overturn the defendants conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED the ^ day of March, 1995 
JfaMEST'MJ ?AF(K )^ 
AttorneyLjEox^-^efendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
AMENDMENT IV 
U n r e a s o n a b l e s ea rches and seizures . ! 
The right nf thf people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized 
.^V<^<jO';x,SH5 
•Set 
r i \ ]-i. 11'/wea.son;il>i«- - r a ' v i i e s f o r b i d d e n — 
i s s u a n c e o/' n arr.H.'H. J 
The Mifhl «>! ihf !•!•"{'."• !'• ' •• -eeu:v i.'i *h? .•: per-
.Min-. houses . papt-r> . i r i •-. • r!?ec:.- .^a:: : . - ; u n r c a - ' f u i b i e 
u a r r a n i -bai l issue bi;* up*.:: :>r<ibab!t- e a u - -sup-
[iDric!! (i;> naif: (tr nfi'ir-Vi.i: :•••:••. ;..,••.••» a u i a : !\ di.-scribing 
'
 ;
 place f<» be MM rebec;. ;••.••:' ; "•• ••--•••••-
• ' M Z l - i 
"*: l o b e 
185 OCCUPATIONS AND P K U ^ o o i v n u 
, and labeled in compliance with the require 
*£ . f § 305 of the Federal Comprehensive Drug 
? r s e Prevention and Control Act of 1970 
(2) No person except a pharmacist for the purpose 
/filing a prescription shall alter deface or remove 
nv label affixed by the manufacturer 
(<i) Whenever a pharmacist sells or dispenses any 
trolled substance on a prescription issued bv i 
00,1
 titioner he shall affix to the container in which 
t te substance is sold or dispensed a label showing his 
wn name address dnd registry number or the 
fune, address and registry number of the pharma 
?£t or pharmacy owner for whom he is lawfully act 
r the prescription number the name of the patient 
rfthe patient is an animal the name of the owner 
e animal and the species of the animal the name 
^ e practitioner by whom the prescription was 
tten, any directions stated on the prescription and 
directions required by rules and regulations pro 
, J#d by the department 
[JTperson shall altei the face or remove any label 
long as any of the original contents remain 
i) An individual to whom or for whose use any 
ttrolled substance has been prescribed sold or dis 
_ by a practitioner and the owner of anv animal 
foich any substance has been prescribed sold or 
by a veterinarian mav lawfullv possess it 
ill the container in which it was delivered to him 
16 person selling or dispensing it 1986 
'•8. Prohibited acts — Pena l t i e s 
Prohibited acts A — Penalties 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter it is 
lawful for any person to knowinglv and inten 
[onally 
(i) produce manufacture or dispense or 
to possess with intent to produce manufac 
ture or dispense a controlled or counterfeit 
substance 
(n) distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance or to agree consent offei oi ii 
range to distribute a controlled )r c mntcr 
fcit substance 
(in) possess a controlled substance it the 
course of his business as a sales reprtscnta 
tive of a manufacturer or distributor of j b 
stances listed in Schedules II thiough \ e\ 
cept that he mav possess such controlled ub 
stances when thev are prescribed to him hv a 
licensed practitioner or 
0v) possess a controlled oi counterft it ub 
8tance with intent to distribute 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec 
lion (l)(a) with respect to 
d) a substance classified in bchedule I or 
II is guilty of a second degree felonv and 
Upon a second or subsequent conviction of 
Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree 
lelony, 
(ji) a substance classified in Schedule III 
g p y or marijuana, is guilty of a third de 
felony and upon a second or subsequent 
eviction punishable under this subsection 
~ulty of a second degree felony or 
) a substance classified in Schedule V is 
oi a class A misdemeanor and upon a 
or subsequent conviction punishable 
fethis s u bsection is guiltv of a third de 
" acts B — Penalties 
unlawful 
(i) foi anv person knowinglv and inten 
tionallv to possess oi use a controlled ^ub 
stance unless it was obtained under a \ ihd 
prescription or older dittctly from a pi icti 
tioner while acting in the couise of hi& pio 
fessional practice or as otherwise author l/ed 
bv this subjection 
(in for any owner ten int licensee or per 
son in control of inv building room tene 
ment vehicle bo it iitcr ft or othe r pi ice 
knowingly and mtentionallv to permit them 
to be occupied bv persons unlawfully possess 
ing using or distributing contiolled sub 
stances in anv of those locations 
(m) for any person knowinglv and inten 
tionally to be present where controlled sub 
stances are being used or possessed in viola 
tion of this chapter and the use or possession 
is open obvious apparent and not concealed 
from those present however a person may 
not be convicted under this subsection if *he 
evidence shows that he did not use the sub 
stance himself or advise encourage or assist 
anyone else to do so any incidence of prior 
unlawful use of contiolled substances b\ the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this de 
fense 
(iv) for any perbon knowingl} and inten 
tionally to possess an altered or forged prt 
scnption or wntten order for a controlled 
substance 
(\) for a practitioner licensed under this 
chapter knowinglv and mtentionallv t j pre 
scribe administer or dispense a contiolled 
substance to a juvenne w ithout first ob a n 
ing the consent requ red in Section 7^ H r> 
of a parent guardian or person standing in 
loco parentis of t i e juvenile except in cases 
of an emergenev for purpose* of this sub ec 
tion a juvenile means child asdef inedm 
Section /8 id 1 and emergenev mean m\ 
phv K \\ L nd i n r ^J I int, tru idm tr \ 
ti n of i ntr 11 J it tanee f >r irrn i it 
relict uf p mi t ie i ing 
vi i JI i \ I ic net hcen eel r u 
eh^ptei Kn( vin,J\ id in ten t imi v t \\ 
scribe oi idmini lei Josages ){ a u r ro I'd 
substance in e\ce f medically rec ^ni i 
quantities mce dr\ t treat the i h n i 
maladv ( i conditicn ot the ul ' imate iw r t 
\u ) (ot at v pet son to presence i c m m 
tei oi dispense itu c ntrolled subctanc L 
anothei pe ism kn w ng that the otht i
 t 
son is us ing i false name address ( t l e i 
personal i n f i r n m m n f r the purpose of e 
cur ing the same 
(b) Am person e )n\icted of violating s i b ^ i 
tion (2)(aHi> with respect to 
u) marijuana if the amount is 10* pm i 1 
or more is guiltv of a second degree jelom 
in) a substance classified in Schedu t i oi 
II or marijuana if the amount is m re than 
16 ounces but less than 100 poundb I eu Itv 
of a third degree felony or 
(in) marijuana if the marijuana I not in 
the form of an extracted resin from inv p irt 
of the plant and the amount is more than 
one ounce but less than 16 ounces nu kv 
of a class A misdemeanoi 
(c) Any person convicted of violating bubsee 
tion (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries 
of property occupied bv any correctional 'acilitv 
58-37-8 O C C U P A T I O N S AJNJL) F K U r U f c t o l U l N S «tj 
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or 
other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a 
penalty one degree greater than provided in Sub-
section (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of 
possession of any controlled substance by a per-
son previously convicted under Subsection (2)(b), 
that person shall be sentenced to a one degree 
greater penalty than provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection 
(2)(a)fi) with respect to all other controlled sub-
stances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), 
or (iii), including less than one ounce of mari-
juana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a 
second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the per-
son is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon 
a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tions (2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(vii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(\) who is subject to this chapter to distrib-
ute or dispense a controlled substance in vio-
lation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense a controlled substance to 
another licensee or other authorized person 
not authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a 
symbol required by this chapter or by a rule 
issued under thi^ chapter; 
(i\) to refuse oi fail to make, keep, or fur-
nibh anv record, notification, order form, 
statement, invoke or information required 
under this chapter, ei 
vi m refuse t-mr\ into any premises for 
inspection a- authorized by this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion f3na) shall be punished b\ a civil penalty of 
not more than $5,000 The proceedings are inde-
pendent of. and not in lieu of. criminal proceed-
ings under this chapter or any other law of this 
state If the violation is prosecuted by informa-
tion or indictment tthich alleges the violation 
was committed knowingly or intentionally, that 
person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree 
felony 
(4) Prohibited acts 1) - Penalties 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly 
and intentionally 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture 
or distribution of a controlled substance a 
license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for 
the purpose of obtaining a controlled sub-
stance, to assume the title of, or represent 
himself to be. a manufacturer, wholesaler, 
apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, 
or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to 
procure or attempt to procure the adminis-
tration of, to obtain a prescription for, to pre-
scribe or dispense to any person known to be 
attempting to acquire or obtain possession 
of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or 
failure by the person to disclose his receiving 
any controlled substance from another 
source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge 
alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of
 a 
false name or address, 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescrip. 
tion or written order for a controlled sub-
stance, or to utter the same, or to alter any 
prescription or written order issued or writ-
ten under the terms of this chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material 
information in any application, report, or 
other document required to be kept by this 
chapter or to willfully make any false state-
ment in any prescription, order, report, or 
record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any 
punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing de-
signed to print, imprint, or reproduce the 
trademark, trade name, or other identifying 
mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any 
drug or container or labeling so as to render 
any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (4)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this 
section, a person not authorized under this chap-
ter who commits any act declared to be unlawful 
under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah 
Drug Paraphernalia Act. or under Title 58, 
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties 
and classifications under Subsection (5Kb) if the 
act is committed: 
(i! in a public or private elementary or 
secondary school or on the grounds of any of 
those schools; 
1
 ii' m a public or private vocational school 
or post-secondary institution or on the 
grounds of am of those -chool^ or institu-
tions, 
mil in those portion- of any building, 
park, stadium, or other structure or grounds 
which are. at the time of the act. being used 
for an activity sponsored by or through a 
school or institution under Subsections 
(5><a)(i) and (ii). 
<iv) in or on the ground- of a preschool or 
child-care facility. 
iv) in a public park, amusement park, ar-
cade, or recreation center. 
'vi) m a church or synagogue, 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, 
stadium, arena, theater, movie house, play-
house, or parking lot or structure adjacent 
thereto; 
<viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
'ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, fa-
cility, or grounds included in Subsections 
(5>ta>0) through (viii): or 
f x) with a person younger than 18 years of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is 
guilty of a first degree felony and shall be impris-
oned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been estab-
lished but for this subsection would have been a 
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first degree felonv Imposi t ion or execu t ion of the 
sentence m a y not be suspended a n d t h e person is 
not eligible for paro le un t i l t he m i n i m u m t e r m of 
impr i sonment u n d e r th i s subsec t ion h a s been 
served 
(c) If the classif ication tha i would o the rwi se 
have been es tab l i shed would have been less t h a n 
first degree felony but for th i s subsec t ion a 
person convicted under th i s subsec t ion is gui l ty 
of one deg i ee more t han the m a x i m u m pena l ty 
prescribed for t h a t offense 
(d) It is not a defense to a p rosecu t ion under 
this subsect ion t h a t the actor m i s t a k e n l y be 
heved the ind iv idua l to be 18 v e a r s of age or 
older a t t he t i m e of the offense or w a s u n a w a r e of 
the individual s t r u e age nor t h a t t he actor mis 
takenly believed t h a t t he location vvhere t he act 
occurred was not as described in Subsec t ion (5)(a) 
or was u n a w a r e t h a t the location w h e r e t h e act 
occurred was as described in Subsec t ion 5)(ai 
fe\ A n v violat ion of th i s c h a p t e r for which no pen 
' • is specified is a class B m i s d e m e a n o i 
f) Any person who a t t e m p t s or consp i res to com 
[T»any offense unlawful u n d e r t h i s chapter is upon 
Eviction gui l ty of one degree less t h a n the max i 
§jm penal ty prescr ibed for t h a t offense 
K ) (a) Any pena l ty imposed for v io la t ion of t h i s 
E j e c t i o n is in addi t ion to and not in lieu of a n y 
R 5 v i l or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e pena l ty or sanc t ion a u t h o 
• r a z e d by law 
BT~ (b) Where violat ion of th i s chap te r v io la tes a 
Bfederal law or t h e law oi a n o t h e r s t a t e convict ion 
K o r acquit tal u n d e r federal law or t h e law of an 
B o t h e r s t a te for t he Same act is a b a r t prosecu 
K z i o n in th i s s t a t e 
B ) (a) When it appea r s to the court a t tl e t ime of 
fcientencing any person conv icted u n d e r th i s c h a p 
E v e r tha t the person has prev IOUSH bt.cn conv icted 
Hfof an offense unde r the laws )f h is ^ ta te t he 
K U n i t e d S ta tes or anothe i s ta te wl ic h f commit 
•feted in this s t a t e would hf- an offen * itn n t in 
^ c h a p t e r and it appeal *} i t 
Jbe of benefit to the u d e i ^Lr 
Would be c o n t r m t nc 
lection of socict tht cc i 
tion 77 18 1 m a } f t u 
jubsection (9)(b impc < i 
lerved by the defendant up t 
Aim sentence imposed uv v 
ttmitted 
((b) (i) Before anv persor rn i 1 
a m i n i m u m term as L » I \ 
(9)(a) the prosecut ing i t i 
jury if an indictment h i i 
J Scribed upon the com pi nn i i 
cases or the i n f o i m a ' i o i 
^addition to the subs t an t ive cfh i < c\ a rg^d 
I * s t a t emen t se t t ing forth }* H , , Q past 
' -pnvic t ion of the defendant and p e u f i c a l h 
a tmg the date and place of conv iction and 
» offense of which the d* f e rd? i t w is con 
9Cted The al legat ion shal l be p re sen t ed to 
r d e f e n d a n t a t the t ime of his a r r a i g n 
eat, or af terwards by leave of cour t b u t in 
y e v e n t la ter t h a n two d i v s p n o i to t h e 
lof the offense charged oi t h e de fendan t s 
"•tog a plea of gui l ty M t he t ime of a r 
Knent or a l a t e r da t^ w h e r g r a n t e d bv 
°Urt, the court shal l r e d d the i l l ega t ion 
H r f v f V l ° U S c o n v i c t l o n to t in d e f e n d a n t 
gae h im or his counsel wi th , copv of it 
e x p l a i n to the defendan t the conse 
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 \ 
H
 n i 
i t H 1 
) 
^>c( 
w i t h 
( b e 
i i \ i 
ffcnse 
( < U 
( t i n 
g r u i n 
e hi > ib 
i It me inc i 
i I etmeii t in 
u f 
q u e n c e s of t he a l l ega t ion u n d e r Subsect ion 
(9)(a) T h e a l l e g a t i o n of the past convietion of 
t he d e f e n d a n t is- not admiss ib le in a j u r \ 
t r ia l except w h e r e t he admissibi l i ty n evi 
dence of a p rev ious convict ion s o t h t t w i s c 
recognized a s admis s ib l e bv law 
(n) T h e cour t following conviction if th< 
de fendan t of t h e s u b s t a n t i v e offense charged 
and prior to impos ing sentence shal l inform 
the d e f e n d a n t of i ts decision to impost i min 
i m u m s e n t e n c e u n d e r Subsect ion <9><a i n d 
i n q u i r e a s to w h e t h e r t h e defendan t a d m i t s 
or den i e s t h e p rev ious conviction if the de 
f e n d a n t d e n i e s t h e prev ious conviction the 
cour t sha l l affoid h im an opportuni tv to 
p r e s e n t ev idence showing t h a t the a l lega t ion 
of t h e p a s t convic t ion is e n o n e o u s or the con 
viction was lawfullv vaca ted or the defen 
d a n t was p a r d o n e d T h e evidence s h a h be 
m a d e a m a t t e r of record Fol lowing the evi 
dence t h e cour t -.hall m a k e a finding i to 
w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s a previou con 
vict ion w h i c h f inding is final except for a 
s h o w i n g of a b u s e of d iscre t ion Following the 
f indings by t h e court the de fendan t shall be 
sen tenced u n d e r Subsec t ion 9 (a) or under 
t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p e n a l t y provided bv law a 
t h e cour t in i t s d iscre t ion d e t e r m i n e s 
c) Anv pe r son s e n t e n c e d on a second offense to 
p roba t ion who v io la tes t h a t probat ion is ^ubiect 
to Subsec t ions (9)(a) a n d (9>(b> 
id) N o t h i n g in t h i s section in anv wav l imi ts c r 
r e s t r i c t s Sec t ions 76 h 1001 and 76 8 1002 
(10 In a n y p rosecu t ion for a violat ion ot th i s char; 
t e r evidence o r proof wh ich show b a person oi p n s m ^ 
produced m a n u f a c t u i e d possessed d i ^ t n b u t d oi 
d i spensed a cont ro l led s u b s t a n c e oi s u b s U n a s 
p u m a facie ev i d e n a t h i t he person or pers< r J c< 
wi th knowjpjgf of the ch i r a r t e r of the ub t i 
sub Tance 
11 Thi t et i < p i hibit e t 
in ^c d r it1 d h e >ursc of hi p 
piaCt et )n! IK i >i n ma I fi n )r 
d ispen mg r i m i n s e; r L ccntrol leu ur 
from caus ing t h t ul in e to )c a d m i m te 
a s s i s t an t or oide Iv under is a rect icn i id u 
sion 
(12 Civil or r m n n a i n<ihilit\ mav ni t b< 
under th s sect ion >n 
a( anv pe r son reg i s t e red u n d e r the ( i 1 
b u b s t a n c t \o who n m u f a c t u i e s d 
j r possesses an iin < m o n o n t r o H n d s d 
use as a pi icebc ( r nves t i ea t i ona l i e\ 
reg is te red p i a e M t u n e r in he ordin r 
professional p r a c t ' e e ^r l e^earch or 
b) anv 1 iw enforcement officer i r T 
course nd leg i t imate scope of his errpU m< > 
( H If anv pi ov is 'on of th i s c h a p t e r or tl i pn ! 
t i o r of a n y provis ion to a rv person or c i rcum rues 
is held inva l id the r e m a i n d e r of t h i s chapte i shall be 
given effect w i t h o u t t he inval id provision er a p p h c i 
tlOn !9*U 
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c e r s 
I nves t i ga to r s fyr t h e D e p a r t m e r t of ( mme 
shal l for t he p u r p o s e of enforcing tru provi ions *[ 
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59-19-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Controlled substance" means any drug or 
substance, whether real or counterfeit, as defined 
in Section 58-37-2, that is held, possessed, trans-
ported, transferred, sold, or offered to be sold in 
violation of Utah laws It does not include mari-
huana 
(2) "Dealer' means a person who, in violation 
of Utah law, manufactures, produces, ships, 
transports, or imports into Utah or in any man-
ner acquires or possesses more than 42 lh grams 
of marihuana, or seven or more grams of any 
controlled substance, or ten or more dosage units 
of any controlled substance which is not sold by 
weight 
(3) "Marihuana" means any marihuana, 
whether real or counterfeit, as defined in Section 
58-37-2, that is held, possessed, transported, 
transferred, sold, or offered to be sold in violation 
of Utah laws 1988 
59-19-103. Tax imposed on marihuana and con-
trolled substances. 
( D A tax is imposed on marihuana and controlled 
substances as defined under this chapter at the fol-
lowing rates 
(a) on each gram of marihuana or each por 
tion of a gram $3 50 
(b) on each gram of controlled substance oi 
each portion of a gram, $200, and 
(c) on each 50 dosage unit^ of a controlled sub 
stance that is not sold bv weight, or portion 
thereof, $2,000 
(2) For the purpose of calculating the tax under 
this chapter, a quantity of marihuana or other con 
trolled substance is measured bv the weight of the 
substance, whether pure or impure or dilute or by 
dosage units when the substance is not sold by 
weight, in the dealer's possession A quantit> of a 
controlled substance is dilute if it consists of a detect 
able quantity of pure controlled substance and anv 
excipients or fillers 1988 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
i h t ( 
COUNTY OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH lXo ° 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Garth Wilkinson, 
Supervisor of the Iron/Beaver Counties Narcotics Task Force, I am satisfied that within a certain 
residence known as the 'Marcos" residence, said residence being more particularly described as 
a white frame home, with green trim, located on 2400 North and Lund Highway in Iron County, 
State of Utah, said residence fronted by a dirt road on the north side, and facing in a southerly 
direction, with a white travel trailer on the southwest side of said residence, and a large stack of 
hay also located on the southwest side of said residence, surrounded by several large trees and 
being the only residence between 2500 North and Lund Highway on the north side of the dirt 
road, and moreover, that within a certain Jeep Cherokee, white in color, license plate number 
unknown, said vehicle being parked in front of the afore-described residence, your affiant has 
reason to believe there is now certain property or evidence described as. 
Controlled substances including marijuana and methamphetamine, 
together with papers, checks, bills, notes, or other documents 
relating to the purchase and sale of controlled substances, 
and that said property or evidence is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed, is being 
possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and 
consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal 
conduct. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED: in the daytime, to make a search of the 
above-named or described premises and vehicle, for the hereinabove described property or 
evidence, without announcing your presence as police officers and without notice, and if you find 
the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
County of Iron, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this 
Court. 
Given under my hand this <s '( — day of October, 1993, at the hour of M:#f Am. 
BY THE COURT 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE I PHILIP EVES, FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUDGE, IN AND 
FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
That your Affiant, Garth Wilkinson, is a peace officer employed by the Utah Department 
of Public Safety, presently assigned as the Supervisor to the Iron/Beaver Counties Narcotics Task 
Force, has been a peace officer for in excess of twenty-four (24) years, and has reason to believe 
the following, to wit: 
That within a certain residence known as the "Marcos" residence, said residence being 
more particularly described as a white frame home, with green trim, located on 2400 North and 
Lund Highway in Iron County, State of Utah, said residence fronted by a dirt road on the north 
side, and facing in a southerly direction, with a white travel trailer on the southwest side of said 
residence, and a large stack of hay also located on the southwest side of said residence, 
surrounded by several large trees and being the only residence between 2500 North and Lund 
Highway on the north side of the dirt road, and moreover, that within a certain Jeep Cherokee, 
white in color, license plate number unknown, said vehicle being parked in front of the afore-
described residence, your affiant has reason to believe there is now certain property or evidence 
described as: 
Controlled substances including marijuana and methamphetamine, 
together with papers, checks, bills, notes, or other documents 
relating to the purchase and sale of controlled substances; 
and that said property or evidence is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed, has been used 
or is being possessed with a purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a public 
offense, and consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party 
to the illegal conduct. 
I believe the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crimes of 
Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute, a Second-Degree Felony, and 
Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute, a Third-Degree Felony. The facts to establish 
the grounds for issuance of a search warrant are as follows: 
1. On October 27, 1993, your affiant oversaw a "drug raid" involving fifteen (15) 
peace officers in Iron County, State of Utah, serving nineteen (19) felony warrants on persons 
charged with felony drug distribution in Iron County. 
2. On this date, your affiant was present during the arrest of an individual charged 
with distributing methamphetamine (hereinafter referred to as "C I " representing "confidential 
informant"). Said C.I. told me the following, to wit: (a) that at the "Marcos" residence set forth 
above, there are presently two (2) male Mexican individuals who travel to Iron County, State of 
Utah, on a regular basis to deliver large quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine, (b) that 
the only individual he knows by name is called "Marcos" and he speaks English, but the other 
individual does not speak English, (c) that the C.I. was at the residence within the last twenty-
four (24) hours and observed approximately five (5) pounds of marijuana and approximately one-
quarter (1/4) pound of the controlled substance methamphetamine, (d) that said C.I has purchased 
controlled substances from "Marcos" at the location described herein on several prior occasions, 
and (e) that said C.I. could identify several other persons in the Iron County area who have 
purchased marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine from "Marcos" at that location. 
3. That your affiant asserts that the C.I. is trustworthy and has provided reliable 
information in that said CI. was asked to inform your affiant of all known drug buyers, users, 
and sellers in the Iron County area, and said C.I. told me of seven (7) individuals who are selling 
or buying quantities of narcotics in Iron County. Your affiant, as a supervisor of the Narcotics 
Task Force, can verify that the information provided by C.I. is trustworthy and reliable. 
Moreover, your affiant asserts that the information is reliable in that CI. is presently charged with 
two (2) second-degree felonies and has been offered a plea agreement by the Iron County 
Attorney wherein CI. would plead guilty to a third-degree felony in the event the information 
is correct and there are large quantities of methamphetamine and marijuana at said residence 
and/or vehicle. 
4. That your affiant asserts that I believe the information is trustworthy and reliable 
in that CI. states CI . was at the residence last night, observed the marijuana and 
methamphetamine in a "large foot locker" and also observed digital scales for weighing controlled 
substances in "Marcos'" dresser drawer. 
5. That your affiant was informed by CI. that CI . believes "Marcos" and the other 
unidentified male Mexican may attempt to flee the area if they observe narcotics officers. 
Moreover, CI . informs me that they have a dog by the name of "Ginger" or also referred to as 
"Here dog" who is vicious and will bite. Finally, CI . informs me that "Marcos" and the other 
unidentified male have informed CI. that they are closely associated with the "Mexican mafia" 
and that they may be dangerous and may pose a threat of violence to officers serving a search 
warrant. 
6. WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure 
of said items at the residence and/or within the vehicle which have been more particularly 
described herein, said search warrant to be served in the daytime and without notice by law 
enforcement officers. 
DATED this < ^ 7 day of October, 1993. 
AFFIANT: 
GARTH WILKINSON 
Iron/Beaver Counties Narcotics Task Force 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ^ 2 / — day of October, 1993, at the 
hour otll-Of fim. 
5HILIP EVES 
ifth District Judge 
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PAROWAN, UTAH; MONDAY, APRIL 4, 1994 
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THE COURT: We're in session. It's 20 minutes 
to 2:00. We have one matter from this morning, 93-0703, 
State of Utah versus Mark Hobel. 
MR. PARK: Mr. Hobel is present, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hobel, will you come forward. 
This matter is on for consideration of 
Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. And in this 
case, there was a warrant issued. 
Mr. Park, are you ready to go forward? 
MR. PARK: Yes, Your Honor, we are. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. PARK: Call Agent Garth Wilkinson. 
THE COURT: What's the basis of your motion, 
before you do that? 
MR. PARK: The basis of our motion is there was 
a Affidavit prepared by Agent Wilkinson after talking to a 
Mr. Yates, who was the alleged confidential informant. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. PARK: Mr. Yates — it's our contention that 
that was the first time that Agent Wilkinson had ever met 
him. That he was charged or was about to be charged with 
two second-degree felonies but was offered a plea and said, 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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"If you give us some names of some drug users, you know, 
we'll give you a plea bargain down the road if that turns 
out to be true." 
The basis of my motion is basically identical to 
that set forth in the Potter case. And I cited that in my 
memorandum, and I have a copy of that for the Court — 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. PARK: — if the Court would like — 
THE COURT: I certainly would. 
Mr. Murdock, would you get that case for me, 
please. Thank you. 
Go ahead, Mr. Park. 
MR. PARK: In that case, Your Honor — it's our 
argument that it's almost identical. 
THE COURT: Well, before you begin arguing the 
merits, isn't the thrust of your motion that the Affidavit 
itself doesn't state probable cause? 
MR. PARK: That's correct. 
THE COURT: I don't understand the need for the 
witnesses. 
How do you — why do you intend to use 
witnesses? 
MR. PARK: If Mr. Burns doesn't want to call any 
witnesses, the only thing I would do is submit it on the 
memorandum and proffer what Mr. Yates would testify to if 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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he were here and let the Court decide. 
THE COURT: Mr. Burns? 
MR. BURNS: Well, Mr. Park cites the Potter 
case. It is somewhat analogous. I think that the Court of 
Appeals, however, held in Potter that one of the reasons 
that they suppressed the evidence based on the written 
warrant was that the officer withheld certain information. 
And the only basis for the warrant was one, information 
from the informant and nervous peering out of a window. 
Those two things. There was no additional corroborating 
evidence. 
I would call Agent Wilkinson, I suppose, in an 
attempt to distinguish this case from the Potter case and 
outline to the Court that there were many more facts 
involved in supporting the Affidavit and search warrant in 
this case. I — it's contained in my memorandum as well, 
and I could simply argue it. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess what I'm saying is if 
the only thing that's before the Court is a reconsideration 
of the sufficiency — 
MR. BURNS: Yes. 
THE COURT: — of t h e A f f i d a v i t , I d o n ' t see 
t h a t evidence i s going t o h e l p . 
MR. BURNS: The only way t h a t — 
THE COURT: I t c a n ' t add anyth ing t o t h e 
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sufficiency of the Affidavit by evidence given now, 
MR, BURNS: The only thing that I see could is 
that if Potter — once there was an evidentiary hearing, 
and there was a determination that "Well, you didn't tell 
us this, and you didn't tell us that. And you should have 
told us this. And this wasn/t true," and some — somehow 
an attack on the ability of the affiant to set forth 
whether or not he truthfully represented to the Court the 
basis of the Affidavit. And we're prepared to do that if 
Mr. Park is challenging it. 
I can state and could proffer that Mr. Wilkinson 
will testify in conformity with the Affidavit. 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Park, are you — is it 
your position that information was withheld from the 
Court? 
MR. PARK: The only thing I would -- you know, 
would assert — and I'm not trying to attack Agent 
Wilkinson — is that on the morning they went to Mr. Yates' 
apartment or house — whatever it was — they had a search 
warrant to go there, too, I believe. And they found drugs 
in his house. 
THE COURT: Who? 
MR. PARK: Mr. Yates' house. The confidential 
informant. And were going to charge him with two 
second-degree felonies. 
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The proffer, if Yates were here, and I would 
propose to the Court is the fact that he had been snorting 
methamphetamine and snorting cocaine all that night I 
believe comes into play just so the Court can see "Well, if 
Agent Wilkinson finds these drugs in this guy's house, and 
I'm preparing these Affidavits, and he's supposed to be a 
reliable informant, I probably should ask him 'When was the 
last time you snorted methamphetamine or cocaine? Are you 
high now? Do you understand what you're telling me?'" And 
none of that was present in the Affidavit. I think it 
takes it one step further than Potter, is what I'm trying 
to say. So in Potter — 
THE COURT: So you're saying you want to 
introduce extrinsic evidence to belie the representations 
of the affiant that this is a — a reliable confidential 
informant? Is that what you're trying to do? 
MR. PARK: Yes. 
THE COURT: And I don't think you can do that 
unless you can demonstrate that these facts were known 
to — to the affiant, and that he withheld them. 
MR. PARK: That's my point. 
THE COURT: Is that what you're trying to show? 
MR. PARK: I think that the facts should have 
been known. Because they find this guy passed out and/or 
asleep in his apartment, and they find that — you know, 
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drugs there. 
THE COURT: So you do want to introduce evidence 
that they withheld information from the Court? 
MR. PARK: Briefly, I suppose. I — not 
necessarily withheld it. It's whether or not they should 
have obtained it, or whether or not they should have known 
to try to obtain that evidence to put that in the 
Affidavit. 
It's my position that if — if they would have 
asked him "Well, are you high on cocaine or on 
methamphetamine?" — they should have known that was a 
possibility based on the condition they found him in. And 
if that would have been in Paragraph 10 of the search 
warrant that "also when we talked to the confidential 
informant, he was high on cocaine," would you have signed 
the warrant. 
THE COURT: Probably. I don't think that being 
under the influence of cocaine or alcohol automatically 
renders you unreliable. 
MR. PARK: I'm not saying that that's the only 
key, I'm saying that's one of the many issues in this. And 
this case is almost identical to Potter where they 
suppressed the evidence. 
THE COURT: Well — 
MR. PARK: But if that's the Court's feeling — 
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THE COURT: All I'm trying to do is determine 
what your attack is. If your attack is the sufficiency of 
the Affidavit in and of itself, no evidence is necessary. 
Because all I need to do is look at the Affidavit and again 
try to determine whether it states probable cause. 
MR. PARK: Well, I think based on the Potter 
case, the memorandum that I've submitted is sufficient 
without evidence. 
THE COURT: If — if on the other hand, you're 
saying that the officers knew things that would have 
convinced the Court not to issue the warrant and withheld 
those so that it would look like there was probable cause, 
then you're going to have to introduce extrinsic evidence 
to show what they knew. So — 
MR. PARK: But I think the Court just gave me a 
feeling that if he was high on cocaine anyway, which would 
be the only extrinsic — 
THE COURT: Well, I was answering your 
question. You said if it was in Paragraph 10, would I have 
signed it. 
MR. PARK: And you said, "Probably anyway." 
THE COURT: That's right. 
MR. PARK: So based on that, I think we'll argue 
sufficiency. I will put on my evidence just to preserve 
the record. 
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THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wilkinson, will you 
come forward, please. Would you step right up here and 
face the clerk and raise your right hand and take the 
oath. 
GARTH E« WILKINSON, 
the witness herein, having been 
first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Have a seat on the witness stand. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PARK: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
unit. 
Please state your name. 
Garth E. Wilkinson. 
You're a resident of Iron County; is that 
No, sir. Washington County. 
Washington County. What is your employment? 
I work for the State of Utah in the narcotics 
Q. And how long have you been doing that? 
A. Nine years. 
Q. Okay. On or about October 27th, 1993, you 
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prepared an Affidavit for Search Warrant; is that correct? 
A. With the cooperation of the county attorney, 
yes. 
Q. Okay. And that was after meeting with a 
Mr. Robert Yates, who we know was the confidential 
informant; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now, on October 27th of 1993, that was the first 
time you ever met Mr. Yates, was it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you go into the house — into his house 
on the morning of October 27th? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Who went in? 
A. I'm not sure which officer went in. I talked to 
him at the county jail. 
Q. Oh. All right. Were you aware that there were 
drugs found in his house? 
A. I was aware that he was — he had drugs on him, 
or they were present. Yes. I was aware of it. 
Q. Do you know how much or what kind of drugs he 
had on him? 
A. I'm going to say — it would be a guess, but 
I — I think around two grams. 
Q. Of methamphetamine or cocaine? 
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A. I think it was meth, but I'm not sure. 
Q. Okay. Did you ask him whether or not he was 
under the influence of those drugs at the time you got this 
information from him that's contained in your Affidavit for 
Search Warrant? 
A. I didn't ask him, because he didn't appear that 
he was. 
Q. Okay. Did you have reason to believe that he 
may have been using drugs, based on the drugs that you 
found on his person? 
A. Not in the last several hours, no. 
Q. That didn't concern you? 
A. No. We woke him out of a — as I recall, he was 
awakened. We were serving those warrants at 6:30, 
seven o'clock in the morning. 
Q. Okay. And that was the first time you met with 
him was October 27th, and that was when you got this 
information; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Did anybody else corroborate anything that 
Mr. Yates told you? 
A. Our — my officers. The task force were aware 
of the people he named as being drug users or dealers in 
the community. 
He took me — or I drove, and he directed me 
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past the suspect's house. We passed it going one direction 
and turned around and came back for identification purposes 
of the house — the residence and surrounding areas for the 
purpose of preparing a search warrant. 
Q. Okay. But you or — you or any other officer — 
none of you had personal observations that Mr. Yates 
described to you of what could be found in the house; is 
that correct? 
A. No. 
MR. PARK: That's all I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any cross-examination? 
MR. BURNS: Just briefly. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BURNS: 
Q. Mr. Yates was able to direct you to the Hobel 
residence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did he tell you the persons that would be 
present there? 
A. He said there would be two male Mexicans. One 
who spoke English, and one who didn't speak English. He 
knew the one as Marcos, and the other one was — he had 
some kind of a name for him. The money man. The person 
that would be holding the money. 
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He told us that — or he told me that they were 
closely associated with the Mexican Mafia and those kinds 
of things, and he was concerned about his safety at that 
point. 
Q. Did he tell you that he had purchased meth, 
cocaine and marijuana there on — 
A. On several occasions, yes, sir. 
Q. And did he tell you how much marijuana would be 
found? 
A. He said that approximately five pounds of 
marijuana; about a quarter pound of meth. 
Q. Did he tell you where you would find the 
marijuana? 
A. Yes. In a footlocker trunk-type thing in the 
bedroom. 
Q. Did he tell you where you would find digital 
scales? 
A. To the best of my recollection, he — he didn't 
say exactly where, but he said that he had seen some. 
Q. Okay. And you asked him for information 
regarding his independent knowledge of persons who buy, 
sell and use narcotics in Iron County? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And he p r o v i d e d you w i t h a p p r o x i m a t e l y s e v e n 
names? 
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A. Six or seven names. 
Q. Were you able to verify those as being persons 
that you knew of in the task force as persons who buy, use 
and/or sell narcotics? 
A, Yes. 
MR. BURNS: Okay. I think that's all I have, 
Your Honor. 
Oh, one more question. 
Q. .At any time when he drove you by the house, at 
any time when he was providing you with the information, at 
any time when you were receiving information, did he appear 
to be impaired, to you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You've been a narcotics officer for how long? 
A. Nine years. 
Q. And a police officer for how long? 
A. 26 years. 
Q. Have you had occasion to observe persons who 
were under the influence of marijuana and/or cocaine and/or 
methamphetamine? 
A. On many occasions. 
Q. Were any of those signs present when you 
interviewed or dealt with Mr. Yates on October 27th of 
1993? 
A. No, they were not. 
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MR. BURNS: Thank you. That's all. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PARK: 
Q. If Mr. Yates testified that he had snorted and 
smoked cocaine that night, and he was still high while 
giving you the information that you received, you'd have no 
reason to disbelieve him, would you? 
A. Well, he didn't — certainly didn't appear to 
be. 
Q. Okay. One other question I have is in Paragraph 
2 of your Affidavit, you state that there are two Mexican 
individuals. One speaks English, one does not. 
Is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Then on Paragraph 5 of your Affidavit, you — in 
the middle paragraph of Paragraph 5, it says finally "CI 
informs me that Marcos and the other identified" — 
"unidentified male have informed CI that they are closely 
associated with the Mexican Mafia." 
So did they both speak English, or did they not, 
or do you know? 
A. To the best of my knowledge, the one did not. 
At least he certainly didn't indicate that he spoke 
English — any English when — when we were speaking to 
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him. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
Any 
MR. 
PARK: 
COURT: 
BURNS: 
COURT: 
other 
PARK: 
Okay. That's all. 
Anything else? 
No, sir. 
You may step down. 
evidence, Mr. Park? 
The only evidence I 
proffer of Robert Yates, the confidential 
proffer. 
Honor, he 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
BURNS: 
COURT: 
PARK: 
would testi 
1993, prior to 
his home, 
— 12 
he had been 
methamphetamine. 
with the 
and he sa 
yet. 
today. 
proffer? 
have would be the 
informant. 
Is this by stipulation? 
Yes, sir. 
All right. You may make your 
If Mr. Yates were present, Your 
fy that on or about October 27th, 
hours prior to the officers going into 
smoking cocaine and snorting 
I asked him if he was high when he was talking 
officers about the information that he gave them, 
id, "Extremely." He said he had 
That 
THE 
. would 
COURT: 
be his testimony if 
Are you willing to 
not come down 
he were here 
accept that 
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MR. BURNS: I am, Your Honor. I have marked the 
Affidavit and Search Warrant as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, and 
I/m wondering if the Court would like that. 
THE COURT: Yes. It should be introduced. 
MR. PARK: No objection. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you. If I may approach. 
THE COURT: You may. Exhibit 1 is received. 
Do you wish to argue the matter further, or do 
you want to rely on your memoranda? 
MR. PARK: I'll submit it based on our 
memorandum and the Potter case. 
MR. BURNS: I'll submit it also. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll take the matter 
under submission, and I'll rule on it during the course of 
the day. 
MR. PARK: Thank you. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings in the 
above-entitled matter were concluded.) 
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